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JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken pursuant to Utah Code Annotated

Sec.

78-2-2(3)(j) and Sec. 3 of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from Summary Judgment entered against
Steven K. Maxfield (Maxfield) Appellant, by the Third District
Court, State of Utah, in favor of the Hi-Country Estate
Homeowners Association, a Utah corporation, (Association),
Appellee.
STATEMENT OP ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Was the prior trial before the Honorable Scott Daniels,

in the case of Richard L. James, et al. v. John W. Davies, et al,
Case No C-81-8560, res judicata and/or collateral estoppel
precluding Judge Hanson from entering Summary Judgment?
2.

Was "equitable servitude11 a proper legal basis for

granting Summary Judgment rather than quantum meruit (unjust
enrichment)?
3.

Was the granting of the Association's Motion for Summary

Judgment improper and prejudicial error, in that, there was no
basis for attorney's fees either in contract or by statute and
there existed genuine issues of material fact as to the
reasonablness and necessity of assessments?

1

DETERMINATIVE RULES
This case is governed by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
The Association obtained judgment in Fifth Circuit Court,
Salt Lake County, Sandy Department, Small Claims Division against
Steven K. Maxfield, ("Maxfield") for an annual homeowners
assessment of One Hundred and Fifteen Dollars ($115.00) per year
for upkeep of roads, utilities and general administration. (R.2,
8). Maxfield appealed to the Third District Court. (R.4). The
parties then stipulated that Maxfield's case and several other
Homeowner's appeals could be consolidated and assigned to the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, C84-5500.

(R.13).

The Association

would file a new complaint as though initially filed in the
District Court and the action would, in all respects, be treated
as initially filed in District Court. (R.14).

Thereafter, the

Association filed a new complaint against the Homeowners
including Maxfield seeking (1) Declaratory judgment (2) Account
Stated (3) Quantum Meruit and (4) Open Account. (R.15, 17, 18,
19, 20). The District Court, by Order dated March 12, 1986,
approved the stipulation and allowed the action to be
consolidated and initially filed. (R.23,24).
Maxfield answered and counterclaimed and, among other
things, alleged that Judge Daniels, in a prior action, Richard L.
James, et al, v. John W. Davies, C81-8560 (in which action
Maxfield was also a Plaintiff), after trial, held that an
2

amendment to the restrictive covenants (Add. B)

which required

Homeowners to be members of the Association and allowed the
Association to assess Homeowners (Maxfield) was void and
unenforceable. (R.31 Para. 5, R.32 Para. 6, R.33 Para. 14, Add.
A).
The District Court ordered the parties to submit uncontested
and contested of facts and brief the legal issues. (R.269, 270).
The District Court on October 9, 1987, after argument ruled,
that if there was a basis for levy, the case was resolved and if
not the matter would go to trial on the claim of unjust
enrichment. (R.380).

The lower Court by Memorandum Decision,

dated November 17, 1987, ruled on the disputed legal issues and
found that the Davis case (supra) did not constitute collateral
estoppel and/or res judicata that would prohibit the Plaintiff
(Association) from levying assessments and the principal of
"equitable servitude" applies entitling the Association to make
reasonable assessments even if the original covenants and
purposes of the Association did not allow such assessments.
(R.382, 383).
On November 3, 1988, the lower court entered Summary
Judgment in favor of the Association against Maxfield in the
principle amount of One Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven
Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents ($1,177.99), costs of Twelve
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($12.50) for a total judgment of One
Thousand One Hundred Ninety Dollars and Forty Nine Cents
($1,190.49) with legal interest and attorney's fees of Three
3

Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Dollars ($3,2 60.00) jointly and
severally among all Defendants. (R.473, 474).
Maxfield made motions under Rules 59 and 60 U.R.C.P. seeking
to amend the judgment and for relief from the judgment which were
denied on March 24, 1989. (R.503, 504, 514, 515).

STATEMENT OP FACTS
Maxfield is a homeowner in Hi-Country Estates, a subdivision
that was begun in 1969 or 1970. (R.82).
The developer initially drafted restrictive covenants
covering the subdivision in 1970. (R.318).

These restrictive

covenants dealt only with the types of uses and structures in
connection with the lots and made no provision for a homeowner's
association, maintenance of common areas, assessments and
collection of assessments. (R.312-318, Ex. C).
Since the first covenants did not deal at all with the
Association, an amendment to the covenants was drafted in 1973
which provided for a homeowner's association, maintenance of
common areas, assessments and their enforcement. (R.3 74, Ex. A,
Add. B ) . The original restrictive covenants and the amendment
were both recorded on March 22, 1974. (R.90).

Hi-Country Estates

Homeowner's Association filed Articles of Incorporation on May
17, 1973 and the Certificate of Incorporation was issued by the
State of Utah on January 5, 1974. (R.360).
For several years things were tranquil between the lot
owners and the Association.

Control of the Association rotated
4

among the membership.

Beginning in 1980, however, a group of

property owners obtained proxies from owners of undeveloped lots
and seized control.

Exercising their control, and over the loud

protests of many lot owners, they began a vigorous program of
suing lot owners, at association expense, to force compliance
with the restrictive covenants. Again over loud protests of some
lot owners, the controlling members appeared at planning and
zoning hearings in a representative capacity for all residents
within the subdivision.

At the annual meeting in 1983, the

protestors claimed that these actions were beyond the authority
granted in the restrictive covenants and the grant of power in
the Articles of the Association.

The protestors demanded that

such actions stop and when the controlling members, exercising
their captive proxies, refused, the protestors, including
Maxfield, (as Plaintiff in the prior action) initiated suit in
the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, assigned to the
Honorable Scott Daniels, entitled Richard L. James, et al v> John
W» Davies, et al. Case No.C81-8560. (R.360).
At trial, extensive materials and testimony were introduced
tracing the development of the subdivision and the role played by
the Association in that development.

A central issue of that

case was the source and scope of the authority of the
Association.

After a lengthy trial, Judge Daniels, on February

17, 1984, ruled that the amendment to the protective covenants
(R. 374 Ex. A, Add. A pg. 2 1. 18-25) that created the
Association, were void and unenforceable and, therefore, there
5

was no lawfully constituted Association.

Judge Daniels ruled

that the amendment was not properly enacted because it was before
the expiration of the term of the original restrictive covenants
in 1995 and the amendment lacked

the consent of the equitable

owners of the property. (Emphasis added) (R.351, Add. A, pg. 2
1.20-25). Judge Daniels also ruled that the directors of the
Association acted in an ultra vires manner (sic) in attempting to
enforce the restrictive covenants. (R.352, Add. Af pg. 3 1.1415) .
No appeal was taken by the parties to the judgment and
findings of Judge Daniels. (R.339, 346) . The Association
nevertheless, continued to levy assessments and bring claims
against delinquent lot owners in small claims court although it
had no legal authority to do so. (R.5).

Maxfield refused to pay

assessments; refused to be a member of the illegally formed
association; refused the services of the association and denied
liability for payment of assessment consistent with Judge
Daniel's ruling. (R.86, 87).
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
Summary Judgment is a harsh remedy which should only be
employed in cases where there clearly is no genuine issue of
material fact which should go to trial by the trier of fact.
Because of its harsh result, it should be employed cautiously by
the court and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the party
moved against, in this case, Maxfield.
Judge Hanson erred by failing to find res judicata and/or
6

collateral estoppel as a complete bar to the Association's cause
of action against Maxfield based upon the prior trial before
Judge Daniels in James v. Davies, C-81-8560 and his ruling that
the Association had no right to assess or collect assessments
against the homeowners and Maxfield had a right based upon that
ruling to disassociate himself from the Association and refuse
its services.
The trial court granted Summary Judgment on the theory of
"equitable servitude" which has no application in this case where
the Association is attempting to assess and levy assessments
against homeowners. Equitable servitude is a restriction or
easement against real property which effects its use or gives
another certain rights to it based in equity.

Davies, C81-8560

and his ruling that the Association had no right to assess or
collect assessments against the homeowners and Maxfield had a
right based upon that ruling to disassociate himself from the
Association and refuse its services.
Even if the trial judge properly applied the "equitable
servitude" theory there is no legal basis for attorneys fees and
a trial would have been necessitated to determine whether the
assessments against Maxfield were reasonable and necessary.
POINT I
THE PRIOR TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, C818560, WAS RES JUDICATA AND/OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
PRECLUDING JUDGE HANSON FROM ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Searle Bros, v. Searlef 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978), at 690,
the Utah Supreme Court discussed res judicata and/or collateral
7

estoppel as follows:
"In general, a divorce decree, like other final judgment is
conclusive as to the parties and their privies and operates
as a bar to any subsequent action. In order for res
judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties
or their privies and also the same cause of action; and this
precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have
been litigated as well as those that were, in fact,
litigated in the prior action. If the subsequent suit
involved different parties, those parties cannot be bound by
the prior judgment.11
"Collateral estoppel, on the other hand, arises from a
different cause of action and prevents parties or their
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second
suit that were fully litigated in the first suit. This
means that the plea of collateral estoppel can be asserted
only against a party in the subsequent suit who was also a
party or in privity with a party in the prior suit."
[Emphasis added, citations omitted]
Even though a later claim may be different than in a prior
case, if the facts required to prove the claim in the later case
are the same facts previously litigated, res judicata will
operate to prevent relitigation.

In Krofcheck v. Downey State

Bank, 580 P.2d 243 (Utah 1978), the court applied the doctrine of
res judicata to uphold the dismissal of a Plaintiff's action
against an attorney based upon an alleged false affidavit where,
in a previous case, the court had rejected the Plaintiff's
assertation of the falsity of the attorney's affidavit as a
defense.

In Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983),

the court refused to apply the doctrine of res judicata and
stated:
"Accordingly, we have determined that res judicata is
not applicable to the present case because it is based on a
different claim, demand, or cause of action than that of the
1967 litigation. The two causes of action rest on different
states of"facts and evidence of a different kind of
character is necessary to sustain the two causes of action.
8

Moreover, the evidence of the two causes of action relates
to the status of the property in two completely different
and separate time periods. Thus, the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply to preclude the Plaintiff from
maintaining his present cause of action.11
From the foregoing, clearly res judicata is applicable to
this case:
a. Same parties. Although all of the parties in the James
v. Davies case are not parties in this case, all of the parties
in this case were also parties in the James v. Davies case and
each were represented therein by counsel.
h. Same issues.

In their fourth cause of action in the

James v. Davies case (R.326, 329), the Plaintiffs Apellant herein
alleged, inter alia;
"27. There presently exists on record certain
protective covenants against the property contained in the
Hi-Country Estate Subdivision.
28. Said protective covenants are illegal and void
because they were not properly enacted and because they are
vague.
29. There presently exists in record an amendment to
the protective covenants mentioned above.
30. Said amendment is illegal and void because it was
not properly enacted pursuant to the terms of the original
protective covenants and because the amendment is also
vague. [Exhibit J to Plaintiff's Memorandum].
In their prayer for relief (R.331), they state:
3. Pursuant to the
for an order determining
amendments thereto filed
Subdivision are unlawful

Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action,
that the protective covenants and
against the Hi-Country Estate
and shall be removed."

Attached to this brief as Addendum B is the Amendment to the
Protective Covenants. Without question those covenants deal
9

specifically with the authority of the Association to levy
assessments and to lien the property owner's land to secure
collection of those levies, the central issue in this case.
Even if Judge Daniels had found that the amendment had been
improperly enacted, he could have found the covenants valid
servitude in the property and denied the prayer for relief
therein that the covenants "be removed".

Clearly, these issues

were litigated or should have been litigated in the James v.
Davies case.
c.

Pinal judgment.

Judge Daniels ruling, Add. A, clearly

upheld the basic protective covenants and just as clearly struck
down the amendment thereto.

Since his judgment therein was not

appealed, it is final and binding.
d.

Conclusion.

The doctrine of res judicata should be

applied to bar relitigation of whether or not covenants running
with the land or equitable servitude thereto, authorize the
Association to impose and collect assessments.
Although the doctrine of res judicata is proper to this
case, the Association's claim would similarly be barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.

In Searle, the court listed the

elements of collateral estoppel as:
1. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication
identical with the one presented in the action in question?
2.

Was there a final judgment on the merits?

3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully and
fairly litigated? [at J91].
10

Analyzing this case in light of the foregoing, clearly
requirements 2, 3 and 4 are met.

Judge Daniels ruling in James

v» Davies, Add. A, clearly indicates that the issues were
competently, fully and fairly litigated.

The basic question

litigated in James v. Davies was what authority, if any, does the
Association derive from covenants.
indicates that he decided "none".

Judge Daniel's ruling clearly
Clearly that identical

question is presented in this case since if the Association
derives no authority from covenants, certainly it does not derive
any power to make mandatory assessments.

Clearly the first

requirement for collateral estoppel has been met and application
of the doctrine would be applicable in this case.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDE WHICH HAS NO APPLICATION
TO THIS CASE.
Judge Hanson in his memorandum decision dated November 17,
1987, specifically ruled that;
"Secondly, the Court having determined that the principal of
equitable servitude applies in this case, the Plaintiff
(Association) would be entitled to make reasonable
assessments for expenses related to the common areas, even
if the original covenants and purposes of the Homeowners
Association did not allow such an assessment. (R.383).
The Court in arriving at this conclusion based its decision
on the doctrine of equitable servitude because, "The Defendants
enjoy the use of the common areas and other amenities held in
common for the subdivision." (R.382, 383). The Court admitted
that if recovery on a theory of quantum meruit (unjust
enrichment) was sought a trial would be necessary. (R.383 T 528
11

pg. 49 1. 11-25).
The trial Court erred by labelling unjust enrichment or
quantum meruit as equitable servitude in the granting of Summary
Judgment rather than allowing Maxfield a trial.
Covenants, conditions and restrictions which limit or
restrict the use an owner may make of his land, as for example,
those composed in a general plan of tract reservations, are
sometimes referred to as negative easements.

However, these are

not true easements because they are not interests in land within
the context of the definition of an easement.

They arise by

virtue of contract and are more properly referred to as equitable
servitude.

(Security Title, Title Standards Manual, 1700 A para.

7, Add. C ) . Even when a covenant does not run with the land,
equity will sometimes enforce the obligation by an injunction
against breach.

The burden of the covenant thus becomes an

"equitable easement or servitude" on the land of the covenantor.
Restatement of Property Sec. 539.

The real basis for the

enforcement of equitable servitude is the doctrine that one who
takes land with notice of a restriction thereon cannot in equity
and good conscience be permitted to violate that restriction.
Brigham Young University Legal Studies, J. Reuben Clark Law
School, 1978, Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol 1. pg. 136.
The doctrine of equitable servitude is a restriction or
limitation on the use of real property but by definition cannot
create an Association or allow the Association to assess its
members which must be created by another means.
12

The amendment to

restrictive covenants that created the Association was held by
Judge Daniels to be void because it did not have the consent of
the equitable owners.

Thus its creation was defective and cannot

be saved by calling it an equitable servitude.

Van Deusen, et

al, v. Ruth, et al., 125 S.W.2d, (1938).
POINT III
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND THE
ISSUE OF THE REASONABLENESS AND NECESSITY OF ASSESSMENTS
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED BY THE TRIER OF FACT.
The trial judge awarded the Plaintiff $ 3,260.00 for
attorney's fees jointly and severally against the Defendants when
he granted Summary Judgment.

The attorney's fees have been

satisfied with the exception of $815.00 which the Association is
seeking against Maxfield.
The general rule is that attorney's fees are recoverable if
provided for by either contract or statute. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co
v, Winburn Title Mfg. Co. 461 F.2d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 1972).

The

Utah Supreme Court has followed that rule since at least 1953.
Hawkins v. Perry, 123 Ut. 16, 27, 253 P.2d 372, 377 (1953).
Turtle Mgmt., Inc. v. Haggis Mgmt., 645 P.2d 667 (Ut. 1982). An
award of contractually based attorney's fees must be based on a
valid contract and incurred in the enforcement of express
contractual covenants. Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498f 499 (Utah
1976). Since there was no contract or statutory basis for
attorney's fees and no exception could be found for awarding
attorney's fees under an equitable servitude doctrine, an award
of attorney's fees is without basis and in error.
13

Judge Hanson admitted that if the assessments were
recoverable under an unjust enrichment (quantum meruit) theory a
trial would be necessary to determine if the charges were
necessary and reasonable. (T. 528 pg. 49 1. 11-21).

Since this

is the only theory that a Summary Judgment could have been
awardedf Maxfield should have been allowed to try the matter on
these issues.
CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment entered by the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, should be set aside and judgment entered in favor of
Maxfield, no cause of action, on the grounds and for the reasons
that the Association's cause of action is barred because of res
judicata and/or collateral estoppel by Judge Daniel's decision in
Richard L. James,

et al, v. John W. Davies, et al., Case No, C81-

8560, or in the alternative the case should be remanded to the
trial court for trial to determine if under a theory of quantum
meruit (unjust enrichment) the Association is entitled to recover
and if so whether the assessments are reasonable and necessary
with an instruction to the trial court that the Association is
not entitled to attorney's fees as they are not provided by
contract or statute and for Maxfield's cost of appeal.
Respectfully submitted this Jj%^ day of July, 1989.

JOMTO-B. ANDERSON
Attorney for Appellant, Maxfield
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
M'AYK OV

4

RICHARD L. JAMES,

6
7

ET. AL. ,

Plaintiffs,

5

U'l.Mi

Civil

No.

C-81-8560

COURT'S RULING

vs.

JOHN W. DAVIES,

ET.

AL.,

Defendants.

8

10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of February,

11

1984, m

12

commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m. the abovs-entitied

13

matter came on for hearing before the Honorable Scott Daniels

14

the above-entitled court at Salt Lake City, Utah,

sitting without a jury, and the following proceedings were
had.

15
16

APPEARANCES:

17

For the Plaintiffs;

R. Clark Arnold. Esq.
Lowe & Arnold
Valley Tower, Fourth Floor
50 Wesc Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

For the Defendants

Con Kostopulo^, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1095 East 2100 South, Suite 235
Salt Lake City. Utah 84106

IS
19
20
21
22
ry
24
25

1
2

l

'.~R -Q...C. •'•; Jv._r>. : N c s

Ui.xcrorpi of pro..-i;, ci r.r.r,)

3
4

Till. CVliT:

and others verses John W. Davics and others, C-81-8560.
First cause of action related to tnc election and

5
6

Th..s j..: tlu: ca.se of KichorJ L. .Ja.-.e*

it was dismissed.
The second cause of action related to the election

7

of officers, and it was also dismissed.
8
The third cau:,e of action relays to authority to
9

enforce the covenants.

10
As I have read the covenants in light of the
11

testimony that's been presented. I'm of the opinion that the

12

type of horneownership that the Homeowners Association has

13

is not a type of horneownership or land ownership contemplated

14

in the restrictive covenants and rule that the Homeowners
Association has no authority-to enforce the restrictive

15
covenants.
16
On the fourth cause of action, the first portion
17
relating to the covenants themselves was dismissed.
13

The second relating to the amendment, I think I'm

19

compelled to rule that the amendment was not properly enacted.

20

First of all i

21

themselves in

22

expiration of that term in 1995.

23

just

SUch

can.t

r e a U y

read

the

restrictive

covenantJj

a way as to allow amendment before the
But even if there were

so,n« uetnod to do that, I think it requires the consent of
the equitable owners of the property.

So on either ground

24
I rule that the amendment is not properly enacted; it is
25

void.

The fifth cause of action relatir.c; to the ability
of the homeowners

ASSUIJI

a t ior. to appeal and present, its vu-us

the zoning actions, I've read the eases cited ar.J the rule
cited, and I'm of the opinion that based upon the language in
the articles of incorporation, the Homeowners Association
does not have the right to hear zoning hearings.
On the sixth cause of action which relates to ultra
vires as well as I find as a matter of fact that there were
no funds used of the Homeowners Association used to prosecute
actions to enforce the covenants.

Therefore, I rule for the

Defendants on that particular claim.
The third part of the sixth cause of action relating
to the elections is moot and is dismissed based upon the
fact that the first cause of actions were dismissed because
of the election question I find to be moot.
I do find that the directors acted in an ultra vires
matter in attempting to enforce the restrictive covenants.
And I suppose the issue of judgement they can't do that, but
I really find no damages in that respect since they didn't
use any Homeowner. Association funds.
I think that the action was prosecuted on both sid£s
in good faith and both sides honestly felt they had a
legitimate position to take and do not. feel that attorney

lees

are appropriately awarded to either side in this case. And
Really since I ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on some of
the issues and in favor for the defendants on others, it's
difficult 10 £3s h^w there's a prevalent party, and therefore,
award no costs.
3

Lh

1
2

Now. did I cover everything or die I Jeavo somethinq
out ?

3
4
5

"". ARKOLD:
judgement.

Thc Judgemont

Woul<J

Hor . OJ

^

. ju st

^

^

clarify3ny

^

^

^

Qp

^

^

^
hg

order would issue against enforcement of the covenants?
THE COURT:

6
7

No. y o u r

I think that's probably appropriate.

Any problem with the fnrm r - ,-u *.
une lorra or that procedure?
MR. KOSTOPULOS:

8
,,,,/vJ

No, y O U r Honor.

The only additional question I might ask, the Court

9
may decline to respond, it being no, p« r h a p3 properly before
10

the Court at the

11

has ruled that the

12

as far as it being improperly enacted and in as much as the

13

amendment to the covenants is the source of mandatory membershijp

14

presunt

time is

thiS;

^

Ifl

^

^

^

^

J

amendment to the covenants is invalid in

in the association itself, and in as much as we are coming
UP very quickly to the February 28th anual meeting of the

15
association. I wonder if-the Court would address the issue
16

of whether or not that meeting should go forth or if there's

17

any point in doing anything with it or whether the association

18

should simply be dissolved at this point?.

19

iii

THE COURT:

Well, I'm C f the opinion that the amend-

ment was improperly enacted which seems to be the source of

21 jmandatory participation in the association.
22

I don't see any

tefcson why the association can't continue to hold its meetings
do what it wants to tfe, * 3 v f c 5

£Vsh

£eli

peQpie

.f

they

^ ^

23
be members, they can't drive on the roads or something.
24
25

as I read the documents, I just see ao -

But

I just cannot come

to the conclusion that that amendment was validly enacted.

And I don't know if I can toll you what the next step is.

I

redlly don't think it was -MR. ARNOLD:
THE COURT:
MR. ARNOLD:
THE COURT:
way it was handled.

I will prepare the findings.
Would you submit those to Mr. Kostopulos?
I will. Your Honor.
All right.

Again, I appreciate tl.e

It was a vary well tried case and the

areas that were submitted were presented very well.
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)

14
15
16
17
18
19
21J
21
22
23
24
25

c E R T .I F J „ C A
^i'/v:"i uv

E

)

UTAII

COU::TV OF S A L T

T

LAKI: )

I , Susan S. Sprouse, do hereby c e r t i f y

that

I am a C e r t i f i e d S h o r t h a n d Reporter and Notary P u b l i c in
and for the S t a t e of Utah;
That as such R e p o r t e r .

I attended the hearing

of the foregoing m a t t e r and t h e r e a f t e r r e p o r t e d in S t e n o t y p e
a l l of the t e s t i m o n y and proceedings had f

and caused s a i d

notes to be t r a n s c r i b e d i n t o t y p e w r i t i n g ,

and the

pages numbered from 2 t o 5 i n c l u s i v e ,

constitute a

foregoing
full,

t r u e , and c o r r e c t r e p o r t of the same.
DATED a t S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah, t h i s 23rd day of
February,

1984.

Susan S, S p r o u s e , CSR/RPR
My commission e x p i r e s :
November 1987
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ADDENDUM B

AMENDMENT TO
PROTECTIVE COVENANTS FOR HI-COUNTRY ESTATES,
LOCATED IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
PHASE I.

This Amendment of Protective Covenants for Hi-Country Estate,
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Phase 1, by the undersigned, beim record owners of more than three-fourths in area of
the -property located within Hi-Ccuntry Estates, hereinafter called
the "Declarants";
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, Declarants executing this amendment are the owners of
record of more than three-fourths in area of the Lots contained
in Hi-Country Estates, located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Phase I.; and
WHEREAS, Declarants executing this amendment desire to amend
the Protective Covenants by adding thereto the provisions hereinafter
contained;
UOW, THEREFORE, Declarants executing this amendment hereby
subject said property to the covenants, restrictions and conditions previously in affect, together with this amendment thereto,
and the acceptance of any deed or conveyance thereof by the Granc.-a
or Grantees therein and their, and each of their heirs, executors,
administrators, successors and assigns, shall constitute their
covenant and agreement with the declarants and with each other, to
accept and hold the property described or conveyed in or by such
deed or conveyance, subject*to such covenants, restrictions and
conditions, with the following amendment, as follows, to-wit:

ARTICLE III.
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMON AREAS
1. Homeowners Association. Hi-Country Estates, Inc., will
form or cause to oe formed a non-profit corporation or association
for the purpose of maintaining and providing for the common arsar,
including roads and streets, and each lot owner or owners will be
members of such association. Persons or entities purchasing a
lot under a contract shall be deemed the owner of such lot for the
purpose of membership in the association.
2. Assessment for Maintenance of Road, Street and Other PiAllc
Services. Eacn Grantee and lot owner for himseif, his heirs,
executors, and assigns, covenants and agrees to pay annually hi*
pro-rata share of the cost to maintain the roads, streets and
common areas, including, but not limited to, the common areas set
aside for the delivery and pickup of mail, the pickup of children
for school by school buses and other vehicles, and an area for
o
garbage collection. Grantee's assessment in this regard shall hi -*
paid promptly when the same becomes due as provided in the By-Laws £a
of the Homeowners Association, and of the Grantees failure to pa/ £»
same promptly when due shall constitute a lien upon the owners*
*"*

i
y

premises and the sane ray be enforced in equity or at law as in the*
case of any l.en foreclosure. Such annual assessment snail not
commence until January 1, 1973, and the first assessment shall be
in the amount of $35,00 por lot ewnee, said amount to be placed in
an account and to be u-sed exclusively by tr.e Hcreowners Association
for tne purccses hereinabove mentioned, and for sucn other servient
as are deerec important to the development ai.d preservation of an
attractive community and to furtner maintain the privacy and general
safety of the residential '-immunities located in hi-Country Estates,
Frcn-mnd after January 1, 1974, the annual payment may be increasei
each year up to five (Z) percent of the maximum authorised payment
for the previous year. The Homeowners Association is ooligated tc
provide maintenance and all otner services statea aoove only to the*
extent that sjen maintenance and services can be provided with the
proceeds of Sv-cn annual payments. Tha foraccmg annual fee may b«.
increased by an arount greater than five (5) percent of the mai:ir..^a
authorized payment for the previous year, by the written consent of
a ma^or^ty of the lot owners. At sue: .ime as any public body siid.i
undertake to -amta.nthe roads and stilts ana provide the other
services contamo.atej nerein, this covenant snail cease, terminate,
and be held :cr naught.
3. Extortions of ^cads and Common ^reas. Hi-Country Estates
Tic. , reserves t.ie r-gnt to extend tr.e roac system into property
ai]oir.uig 4i-Cc^ntry Estates, and to plat additional subdivision
areas wuci «c:ld be an extension of the road system and common
areas as ccntr-olated herein. Should sucn extension ta>ce effect,
the lot owners within the ac^oinmg suodivisions shall be required
tc become mercers of the Homeowners Association as contemciatec
herein and tt pay tneir pro-r3ta share of tne cost.
4. Cff jjt of * -p-dm^t. Eac* and ever; other restriction a. d
covenant conca...ea i- tne Protective Covenants are heresy reaff-r~ed
as heremaoove mcdifiec and amended.
DATE3 this 6tn

day of .April

V •

t :V ^^Cor*7oxatc Seal}
President
... [ Secifet^ry

# 1973.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: S3.

Co* Uy of Salt Lake)
/
-•"•

On the

day of April. 1973, pi rsonally appeared before me

CHAFM.FS E. t.EWTON and D. K A E T H SPE\ ? CER who being by me duly
sworn did sny, each 1'or himselT, thai he t|-»e said Charles ... Lewton
is the president *nd he, the said D. Kteth Spencer is the s e c r e t a r y of
iii-CCUMTRY ES7A • 'CS. INC, and that the witnin und foregoing instrument was signed in b e h a l ' of j a i d rorporatiun by authority of a resolution
of its Board of D i r e c t o r s and said Charles E. Lewton and D. Kteth Spencereach duly acknowledged to m : that said corporation executed the s a m e and
that the seal affixed is the seal of said corporation.
/

7~-\

'.... ,.

NOTARY PUBLIC

#

• ^V^v*nrm*si'u/i Expires:

Residing at:

••.. •• r •
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ADDENDUM C
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IN GENERAL

A.

Definitions, Characteristics, Distinctions
1.

Easement
An easement is an interest in land of another which
entitles its owner to a limited use and enjoyment of
the land in which the interest exists.

2.

a.

It must be created and transferred subject to
the rules of real property.

b.

It constitutes an encumbrance on anothers land,
hence, an owner of land cannot be the owner of
an easement over it.

c.

It is a limited and a non-possessory interest
which restricts the owner to that dominion and
control necessary to the enjoyment of his
interest. The owner of an easement has no
interest which he can assert against third
persons unless they are interfering with his
enjoyment of the easement.

Designation of lands benefitted or encumbered by
easements.
a.

Dominant Tenement
The land benefitted by and to which an easement
is attached is called the dominant tenement.

b.

Servient Tenement
The land upon which a burden or servitude is
created or imposed is called the servient
tenement.

3.

Right of Way
A right of way is a privilege to pass over the land
of another for a particular and expressly stated
purpose. It 1s an easement. However the words
"right of way" are susceptible to ambiguity. They
are sometimes used to describe a right or an interest in land; or they are sometimes used to describe a strip of land over which the easement passes.
A right of way may attach to and be incidental to
the use of a parcel of land, or, it may attach to
and benefit an Individual Independent of his ownership of land.

4.

License
A license is a personal privilege, terminable at
will, to do some act or acts upon the land of

c/otntNia

17.00
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IN GENERAL
another which is not an interest in land and which
is not required to be created in the form or in the
manner of a conveyance.
Rule of Title Practice
A recorded license shall be shown as an encumbrance
on the property it burdens. However, it is not a
proper interest to be insured by a policy of title
insurance.
5.

Profit a Prendre
A profit a prendre is a right to remove a part of
the soil or a product from the soil such as water,
wood, minerals, oil and gas from the land of another.
Historically, it does not involve a use of land.
However, the owner of a profit has a right to enter
upon land and do whatever is reasonably necessary in
the exercise of his right to a profit.

6.

Natural Rights
There are certain rights and interests in land which
are not created by conveyance or contract which
benefit one parcel of land and burden another parcel
which are not easements. They are natural property
rights which are incidental to land ownership.
These attach to and pass with transfers of the soil
but they are never insured nor are they ever reflected
as encumbrances in evidences of title. These include
the following:

7.

a.

The right of a land owner to have surface water
flow without obstruction from his land in its
natural state "as it is wont to flow" over the
land of a lower owner.

b.

The right of a land owner to receive lateral
support from his neighbor's land for the preservation
of his land in its natural state.

c.

The right of an owner to enjoy the occupancy
and use of his land free from unreasonable
sights, sounds and smells occasioned by a
neighbor's use of his land.

Equitable Servitudes
Covenants, conditions and restrictions which limit
or restrict the use an owner may make of his land,
as for example, those imposed in a general plan of
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IN GENERAL
tract restrictions, are sometimes referred to as
negative easements. However, these are not true
easements because they are not interests in land
within the context of the definition of an easement.
They arise by virtue of contract and are more properly referred to as equitable servitudes.
B.

Classification of Easements
!•

Appurtenant Easement
An easement is appurtenant to land when it is created
to benefit, and does benefit, the owner of a dominant
tenement in his use of his land.
For example: A, owner of lots 1 and 2, conveys lot
2 to B "together with and as appurtenant to lot 2 a
non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress over
the northerly 40 feet of Lot 1".
The easement constitutes an encumbrance on Lot 1
(servient tenement) for the benefit of the owner of
lot 2 (dominant tenement).

2.

Easement in Gross
An easement is in gross when it is not created to
benefit or does not benefit a grantee in the use or
enjoyment of his land. In this instance the easement attached to the person instead of to other
land. Hence, there is no dominant tenement.
For examDle: A, owner of lot 1, grants to Pacific
Gas and Electric Co. and easement for pole line over
the rear 5 feet of lot 1.
The easement constitutes an encumbrance on Lot 1
(servient tenement). However, it does not benefit
land owned by the grantee.

C.

Determining Whether Easement is Appurtenant or in Gross
For title insurance purposes 1t is essential that a
recorded easement be identified as either one appurtenant
or as one in gross, and, if it is appurtenant, the dominant
tenement must be identified. Procedures to be followed
in examining, reporting, and insuring easements are
dependent upon establishing these factors.
In many instances the documents creating an easement
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